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Abstract
Fine-tuning through knowledge transfer from a
pre-trained model on a large-scale dataset is a
widely spread approach to effectively build mod-
els on small-scale datasets. However, recent liter-
ature has shown that such a fine-tuning approach
is vulnerable to adversarial examples based on
the pre-trained model, which raises security con-
cerns for many industrial applications. In con-
trast, models trained with random initialization
are much more robust to such attacks, although
these models often exhibit much lower accuracy.
In this work, we propose noisy feature distilla-
tion, a new transfer learning method that trains a
network from random initialization while achiev-
ing clean-data performance competitive with fine-
tuning. In addition, the method is shown em-
pirically to significantly improve the robustness
compared to fine-tuning with 15× reduction in
attack success rate for ResNet-50, from 66% to
4.4% averaged across Stanford 120 Dogs, Caltech-
UCSD 200 Birds, Stanford 40 Actions, MIT 67
Indoor Scenes, and Oxford 102 Flowers datasets.
Code is available at https://github.com/
cmu-enyac/Renofeation.
1. Introduction
Transfer learning is an important approach that enables train-
ing deep neural networks faster and with relatively less data
than training from scratch without any prior knowledge.
There are various forms of transfer learning, depending on
whether the target input and label domains are the same as
the source ones. In this work, we are particularly interested
in the setting where we have different input and label do-
mains between the source and the target datasets, and we
only care about the model’s performance on the target task.
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In other words, our goal is to maximize the performance
on the target task assuming a pre-trained model trained on
a source task is available. This setting has various applica-
tions and has led to state-of-the-art performance in several
image classification tasks (Cui et al., 2018). Moreover, this
setting is also considered in industry in the form of machine-
as-a-service, such as Google’s Cloud AutoML (Google) and
Microsoft’s Custom Vision service (Liakhovich & Mbemba,
2017) where users can upload custom data to fine-tune a pre-
trained model. We refer to this setting as transfer learning
throughout this paper.
Transfer learning for ConvNets has received great attention
due to its effectiveness in achieving high accuracy. (Si-
monyan & Zisserman, 2014) have shown that the pre-trained
model that is trained on a large-scale dataset (such as Ima-
geNet) acts as an effective feature extractor that supersedes
hand-crafted feature extractors. Later, (Yosinski et al., 2014;
Donahue et al., 2014) find that inheriting the pre-trained
weights and starting learning from there (often referred to
as ”fine-tuning”) can result in even larger performance im-
provements. Fine-tuning has then been adopted in various
tasks to achieve state-of-the-art results. Besides fine-tuning,
several prior methods have relied on fine-tuning with an
explicit regularization loss to further enhance the perfor-
mance of transfer learning (Xuhong et al., 2018; Li et al.,
2019). While prior art has demonstrated that fine-tuning
might not necessarily outperform training from random ini-
tialization for some tasks, such as classifying medical im-
ages (Raghu et al., 2019a) and object detection and semantic
segmentation with sufficient training data (He et al., 2019),
it is important to note that fine-tuning is the state-of-the-art
method for small and visually similar datasets such as the
Caltech-UCSD Bird 200 datasets (Welinder et al., 2010).
Very recently, (Rezaei & Liu, 2020) have demonstrated that
fine-tuned models are vulnerable to adversarial examples
crafted solely based on the pre-trained model. In other
words, an adversary can attack a pre-trained model available
on open repositories, e.g., TorchVision, and use the adversar-
ial image to deceive the transferred models. The success of
this attack raises security concerns for the widely-adopted
fine-tuning mechanism, which is also used in industrial
applications such as Google’s AutoML (Google) and Mi-
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crosoft’s Custom Vision (Liakhovich & Mbemba, 2017). In
this work, we take a first step toward alleviating this problem.
Intuitively, the vulnerability to such an attack stems from
the similarity between the pre-trained and the transferred
models. Thus, to improve the robustness of the transferred
models, one would prefer the transferred model to be dissim-
ilar to the pre-trained one. However, we find that existing
fine-tuning methods result in transferred models that are
similar to the pre-trained one, which in turn makes them vul-
nerable to such an attack. In contrast, models trained with
random initialization are much more robust to such attacks,
with the caveat that these models often exhibit much lower
accuracy compared to fine-tuning. As an alternative, we pro-
pose to train from random initialization with noisy feature
distillation, which achieves clean-data performance similar
to fine-tuning and the robustness comparable to training
with random initialization. Quantitatively, the success rate
of `∞-norm projected gradient descent (PGD) attack aver-
aged across five datasets drops from 74.3%, 65.7%, 70.3%,
and 50.75% to 6.9%, 4.4%,4.9%, and 6.9% for ResNet-18,
ResNet-50, ResNet-101, and MobileNetV2, respectively.
Overall, our contributions are as follows:
• Our work is the first towards improving the robustness
of the transferred network against the attack designed
specifically for fine-tuning.
• We propose to conduct transfer learning via training
from random initialization and noisy feature distillation
which results in competitive clean-data performance
with significant robustness improvement over existing
fine-tuning methods.
• We conduct extensive experiments on four networks
and five datasets via hyper-parameter tuning and an ab-
lation study to empirically justify the proposed method.
2. Background
2.1. Transfer learning
In general, the goal of transfer learning is to minimize the
following objective:
L(θ, θlinear) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
L (f(xi, θ)θlinear, yi) +R(θ0, θ, xi)
+Rlinear(θlinear),
(1)
where L(·) is the loss function such as cross entropy, f(·, ·)
denotes the neural network of interest, θ are the weights
excluding the last linear layer of the neural network, θlinear
denotes the weights for last linear layer, θ0 denotes the pre-
trained weights excluding the last linear layer, R(·) and
Rlinear(·) are the regularization functions, n is the num-
ber of training samples, and xi and yi denote the training
data and labels in the target task. Various transfer learning
methods differ in the variables to be optimized and the form
of the regularization functions. We describe four transfer
learning methods and a common baseline we consider in
this paper in the following. We note that in all five baselines,
Rlinear(θlinear) is considered to be β‖θlinear‖22.
Linear classifier (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014) min-
imizes L(·) only w.r.t. θlinear with R(θ0, θ, x) being a
constant function. θ is initialized to be θ0. In other words,
the linear classifier only trains the linear part while using
the pre-trained model as a feature extractor.
Fine-tuning (Li et al., 2020; Donahue et al., 2014; Raghu
et al., 2019b; He et al., 2019; Yosinski et al., 2014) mini-
mizes L(·) w.r.t. both θ and θlinear withR(θ0, θ, x) being
a constant function. θ is initialized to be θ0. In other words,
fine-tuning optimizes the entire pre-trained model.
L2SP (Xuhong et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2019) minimizes
L(·) w.r.t. both θ and θlinear with
R(θ0, θ, x) = λweight‖θ − θ0‖22. (2)
In this case, θ is initialized to be θ0. In other words, L2SP
optimizes the entire pre-trained model while regularizing
the weights to be close to those of the pre-trained model.
DELTA (Li et al., 2019; Jang et al., 2019; Wang et al.,
2020) minimizes L(·) w.r.t. both θ and θlinear with
R(θ0, θ, x) = λfeat
K∑
l=1
1
nl
∥∥∥fl(x, θ)− fl(x, θ0)∥∥∥2
2
, (3)
where K denotes the number of layers excluding the last
classification layer, nl denotes the number of output ele-
ments for the lth layer, fl(·) denotes the function that evalu-
ates the activation of lth layer. θ is initialized to be θ0. In
other words, DELTA optimizes the entire pre-trained model
while regularizing the activations to be close to those of
the pre-trained model. We note that we do not consider the
per-channel regularization weights for feature regularization.
That is, we are considering the so-called DELTA (w/o ATT)
in (Li et al., 2019). Following (Li et al., 2019; Jang et al.,
2019), the layers to match are the last layer of each stage
in the neural network. For example, there are four stages in
ResNets (He et al., 2016).
Re-training is usually used as a baseline to demonstrate
the effectiveness of transfer learning methods. Re-training
minimizes L(·) w.r.t. both θ and θlinear with R(θ0, θ, x)
being a constant function. θ is randomly initialized. In other
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words, Re-training optimizes the entire pre-trained model
with randomly initialized weights. In this case, there is
essentially no information being transferred from the pre-
trained model.
Besides the aforementioned baselines considered in the
experiments, we also discuss efforts in improving trans-
fer learning using additional information or architectural
changes. (Ge & Yu, 2017) developed a method to improve
fine-tuning by leveraging additional training data obtained
from large-scale datasets. (Cui et al., 2018) used Earth
Mover’s Distance to measure domain similarity between
datasets and showed that pre-training on similar domains
results in better transfer. (Wang et al., 2017) discovered that
increasing the model capacity (wider or deeper) improves
the effectiveness of fine-tuning. (Kornblith et al., 2019) in-
vestigate whether better models on the source dataset imply
better models on the target dataset using linear classifiers
and fine-tuning. In contrast, we do not assume having access
to the source data.
2.2. Adversarial examples
Adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2013) for deep learn-
ing models have received growing attention due to their
potential impact on machine learning systems. According
to different threat models, there are various types of attacks.
For example, in a white-box threat model where the ad-
versary knows all the information regarding a model, fast
gradient sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014),
projected gradient descent, and CW (Carlini & Wagner,
2017) have been shown to be strong attacks. Counteracting
these attacks, adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) is
the dominant approach. On the other hand, there are also
methods targeting a black-box threat model where the ad-
versary can only query the model and obtain the probability
vector (Liu et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016; Chen et al.,
2017).
In this work, our threat model assumes that the adversary
has access to the model weights and model architecture for
the pre-trained model. The adversary does not have access
to the task-specific transferred model and query. This threat
model aligns with practical usage of deep learning models
where researchers use pre-trained models on large datasets
(like ImageNet) and fine-tune them for other tasks. Based
on this threat model, prior art (Rezaei & Liu, 2020) has
proposed an attack that successfully compromises the task-
specific fine-tuned models, which raises security concerns
for fine-tuning. In this work, we propose an algorithm to
improve the robustness of the transferred model under this
particular threat model. Recently, (Shafahi et al., 2020)
have proposed to improve the adversarial robustness of the
transferred model in a white-box setting by transferring
to the target model the robust features obtained through
adversarial training. We note that their threat model is very
different from ours. As we will show later in Section 3.4,
for the considered threat model, adversarial training is less
effective than our proposed method.
To craft an adversarial example under our threat model, we
adopt an attack from prior art (Rezaei & Liu, 2020), which
optimizes the following objective:
argmin
δ
‖fK(x+ δ, θ0)− t‖22
s.t. ‖δ‖∞ ≤ B,
(4)
where K is the penultimate layer, t is a target vector that is
set to a scalarmmultiplied by a one-hot vector. m is chosen
to be large andB denotes the perturbation budget. The pixel
intensity in this formulation is normalized and constrained
to [0, 1]. To optimize equation 4, we use projected gradient
descent (PGD). Intuitively, the objective is trying to find
a small-norm perturbation such that the response of the
penultimate layer of the pre-trained model is high in one
neuron but zero in other neurons. Once the perturbation δ
for a specific input image x is found, the perturbed image
x + δ is used to attack a transferred model θ, which the
attacker has no information about. We provide a qualitative
view of the attack in Figure 1.
Regarding the parameters, we set the perturbation budget
B to 0.1, the number of iterations of PGD to be 40, m to
be 1000 (following (Rezaei & Liu, 2020)), and the learning
rate to be 0.01. We use AdvTorch (Ding et al., 2019) for
generating adversarial examples using the above specified
objective and parameters.
2.3. Datasets and implementation detail
In this work, we consider five datasets to transfer to and
models trained on ImageNet as pre-trained models. The
datasets under consideration are shown in Table 1.
We mainly use ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016) throughout the
experiments and provide an ablation study on other net-
works in Section 4.3. For training, we use a batch size of
64 and stochastic gradient descent with momentum follow-
ing prior art (Li et al., 2019; Xuhong et al., 2018). For
the experiments using fine-tuning, i.e., those that start with
pre-trained weights, we use 30,000 iterations to make sure
the loss converges. Additionally, we tune the learning rate,
weight decay, and momentum for fine-tuning each dataset
according to prior art (Li et al., 2020). Specifically, we
tune learning rate ∈ {0.01, 0.005}, momentum ∈ {0, 0.9},
and weight decay ∈ {0, 10−4} using grid search. For
re-training, the hyper-parameters are set throughout the ex-
periments across datasets without tuning. We use 90,000
iterations, learning rate 0.01, momentum 0.9, and weight
decay 0.005. Also, β for R(θlinear) = β‖θlinear‖22 is set
to 0.01 across all the experiments following (Li et al., 2019;
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Figure 1. Qualitative view of the adversarial attack considered and the comparison of transfer learning between prior art and our proposed
method.
Table 1. The characteristics of the datasets for transfer learning we considered in this work. We includes the number of training samples
per class, the number of testing samples per class, and the number of classes.
DATASET TASK CATEGORY # TRAINING SAMPLES # TESTING SAMPLES # CLASSES ABBREVIATION
STANFORD DOGS (KHOSLA ET AL., 2011) FINE-GRAINED CLASSIFICATION 100 ≈72 120 DOG
CALTECH-UCSD BIRDS (WELINDER ET AL., 2010) FINE-GRAINED CLASSIFICATION ≈30 ≈ 29 200 BIRD
STANFORD 40 ACTIONS (YAO ET AL., 2011) ACTION CLASSIFICATION 100 ≈ 138 40 ACTION
MIT INDOOR SCENES (QUATTONI & TORRALBA, 2009) INDOOR SCENE CLASSIFICATION 80 20 67 INDOOR
102 CATEGORY FLOWER (NILSBACK & ZISSERMAN, 2008) FINE-GRAINED CLASSIFICATION 20 ≈60 102 FLOWER
Xuhong et al., 2018).
For fine-tuning methods that come with hyper-parameters
such as L2SP and DELTA, we tune λweight and λfeat
to obtain the best transferred results according to prior
art (Xuhong et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019).
3. Methodology
3.1. Robustness evaluation
We first evaluate the robustness to the adversarial exam-
ples crafted solely based on the pre-trained model for
each of the five baselines. To characterize the robust-
ness across different datasets, we use attack success rate
(ASR), which is calculated by the conditional probability
P (wrong with adversarial-data | correct with clean-data).
As shown in Table 2, methods that rely on the pre-trained
model (the first four rows) are vulnerable to the adversarial
examples crafted solely based on the pre-trained model. As
expected, linear classifier has the worst robustness since
it relies on the model under attack as a feature extractor
without changes. In contrast, re-training provides the best
robustness since it trains the model from random initializa-
tion without inheriting any knowledge from the pre-trained
model.
Table 2. Robustness evaluation for the baseline transfer learning
methods. ASR denotes attack success rate, which is computed as
P (wrong with adversarial-data | correct with clean-data)
(the lower the more robust). Clean denotes the Top-1 accu-
racy for clean-data.
DOG BIRD ACTION INDOOR FLOWER
LINEAR CLASSIFIER CLEAN 84.22 67.02 73.64 72.54 88.52ASR 96.06 96.47 92.49 88.95 86.40
FINE-TUNING CLEAN 81.84 77.67 77.19 75.37 95.71ASR 89.36 50.33 73.75 54.75 14.07
L2SP CLEAN 83.82 77.51 77.22 75.15 95.63ASR 94.08 50.08 92.16 66.73 16.75
DELTA CLEAN 84.39 78.75 77.69 78.36 95.90ASR 95.65 58.83 93.51 79.71 43.65
RE-TRAINING CLEAN 70.77 69.76 51.90 59.93 87.38ASR 5.99 6.14 5.82 6.73 3.00
Interestingly, from Table 2 one can observe that for datasets
such as Bird and Flower, fine-tuning does not fail com-
pletely when facing adversarial examples. The difference
in robustness across datasets is related to how different
the transferred and the pre-trained models are for different
datasets. We further analyze the relationship between ro-
bustness and the distance between the transferred and the
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pre-trained models. Specifically, we consider `2 weight dis-
tance (i.e., Eq. 2) and feature distillation loss (i.e., Eq. 3).
We plot the corresponding distance metrics for the 25 data
points from Table 2 by measuring the feature distance using
the training data. As shown in Figure 2, the distance be-
tween the transferred and the pre-trained models correlates
well with robustness in both distance metrics considered,
which matches our intuition.
Figure 2. Robustness vs. distance between transferred and pre-
trained models for the five baseline methods on five datasets.
In terms of the clean-data performance, the sweet-spot of
similarity to the pre-trained model is dataset-dependent.
Model similarity often helps due to task similarity and lack
of a large-scale target dataset, which is why re-training has
the worst clean-data performance among these methods.
Based on these observations, it is natural to wonder if it
is possible to achieve the best of both worlds, i.e., the ro-
bustness of re-training and the clean-data performance of
DELTA. We conjecture that this is possible if vulnerabil-
ity to attacks and generalization improvements brought by
transfer learning stem from different sources.
3.2. The role of pre-trained weights
We begin by first combining re-training and DELTA. That is,
instead of fine-tuning from pre-trained weights using `2 fea-
ture distillation, we re-train from random initialization using
feature distillation. We term this new method DELTA-R,
which stands for DELTA with randomly initialized weights.
This helps us understand the role of pre-trained weights in
both generalization and robustness. It is important to note
that while this modification is simple, it has not been ex-
plored in prior art and it is not trivial to see if re-training with
feature distillation using a small target dataset is sufficient to
achieve clean-data performance comparable to fine-tuning
with prior knowledge encoded in the pre-trained weights.
As shown in Figure 3, it is encouraging to observe that
DELTA-R can achieve clean-data performance comparable
to fine-tuning (DELTA) with only one to two points of accu-
racy degradation. The competitive clean-data performance
implies that the generalization benefits of the pre-trained
model can be largely captured by the features on the target
dataset. On the other hand, the attack success rate drops
significantly when we re-randomize the weights, which im-
Figure 3. (Left) Clean-data performance and (Right) Attack suc-
cess rate for DELTA, DELTA-R, and re-training.
plies that a large portion of the vulnerability stems from the
pre-trained weights. While encouraging, there is still a gap
in robustness between DELTA-R and re-training for most
datasets.
3.3. Avoiding over-fitting to pre-trained features
DELTA-R removes the vulnerability of the pre-trained
weights, but the transferred models are still vulnerable due
to having features close to those of the pre-trained model.
To further improve robustness, the key technical challenge
is to reduce the similarity between the pre-trained and the
transferred features without hurting clean-data performance.
A naı¨ve idea is to control the strength of the feature regular-
ization term λfeat in Eq. 3 on the hope of achieving better
robustness without hurting the clean-data performance. We
sweep λfeat ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1, 5, 10} for DELTA-R for each of
the datasets. As shown in Figure 4, clean-data performance
and robustness have a trade-off relationship when we control
λfeat. While a controllable trade-off between the clean-data
performance and robustness is useful for application de-
velopers, we are interested in improving the adversarial
robustness without hurting clean-data performance.
Figure 4. The effect of tuning λfeat on the trade-off between clean-
data performance and the attack success rate. Star marks the λfeat
we use.
To develop our approach, a key observation is that regular-
ization techniques in deep learning such as dropout (Hinton
et al., 2012) and stochastic weight averaging (SWA) (Iz-
mailov et al., 2018) are able to improve the generalization
performance at the cost of a higher training loss. In other
words, one can further increase the `2 feature distillation
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loss, which in turn improves robustness, without hurting the
current generalization performance. While there are many
regularization techniques that align with this key observa-
tion, we consider dropout and SWA in this work. We note
that not all regularization techniques in deep learning are
helpful; for example, label smoothing (Szegedy et al., 2016)
does not help since it increases the training cross entropy
loss, but merely affects the feature distillation loss that we
care about.
Dropout was proposed to avoid over-fitting by randomly
dropping out activations during training (Hinton et al., 2012).
In this work, we consider spatial-dropout (Tompson et al.,
2015) for convolutional layers. Spatial-dropout drops chan-
nels randomly during training. Intuitively, this regulariza-
tion technique makes it harder for the optimizer to minimize
the `2 loss between the pre-trained features and the trans-
ferred ones because the latter are randomly set to zeros.
We insert the dropout layer after those that are used for the
feature distillation loss and we use a dropout rate of 10%.
Stochastic Weight Averaging (SWA) has shown great
promise in improving the generalization performance for
deep neural networks (Izmailov et al., 2018). The core
idea is to average numerous local optima to form the final
solution. It has been demonstrated empirically that SWA
improves generalization while increasing the training loss.
We apply SWA on trained DELTA-R models by training
with half of the learning rate, i.e., 0.005, as suggested in
prior art (Izmailov et al., 2018). SWA training considered
has constant learning rate with a third of the iterations of
DELTA-R, i.e., 30,000 iterations. We average the models
every 500 iterations.
Re-training with noisy feature distillation or
Renofeation 1 is our proposed method. It re-initializes the
network weights and trains them with feature distillation
and both dropout and SWA. Both dropout and SWA are
used to alleviate over-fitting the features to the pre-trained
model and improve robustness, hence the name noisy
feature distillation. As shown in Table 3, we observe that
these regularization techniques indeed increase the feature
distillation loss, which in turn improves the robustness
of DELTA-R. Additionally, we find empirically that both
dropout and SWA can work together to achieve better
regularization. From the clean-data performance point of
view, Renofeation remains comparable to DELTA-R while
losing some accuracy for the Dog dataset. We hypothesize
that the accuracy loss in this case may be due to the large
overlap between the Dog and the ImageNet datasets and
therefore matching features alone may not be sufficient.
This can be inferred from the fact that the linear classifier
1Pronounced ”Renovation.”
alone has similar results compared DELTA for the Dog
dataset as shown in Table 2.
When comparing to the baselines, Figure 5 shows that
Renofeation robustness is close to re-training and has clean-
data performance close to DELTA. We note that even though
Renofeation has higher attack success rate than re-training
for some datasets such as Dog and Indoor, it has higher
Top-1 accuracy when facing the adversarial examples due
to a much better clean-data performance.
Table 3. The effect of dropout and SWA on feature distillation loss,
clean-data performance, and robustness for DELTA-R.
DOG BIRD ACTION INDOOR FLOWER
DELTA-R
CLEAN 82.49 77.58 76.79 77.39 94.49
ASR 37.93 7.28 60.83 38.48 14.30
FEATURE LOSS 0.70 1.48 0.72 0.68 0.56
DELTA-R + DROPOUT
CLEAN 81.21 77.72 78.00 77.31 95.35
ASR 17.91 4.24 18.98 22.30 7.44
FEATURE LOSS 0.86 1.57 1.03 0.89 0.68
DELTA-R + SWA
CLEAN 80.32 78.92 78.07 77.69 94.81
ASR 12.87 3.65 23.62 16.72 2.95
FEATURE LOSS 0.86 1.63 0.87 0.82 0.73
RENOFEATION
CLEAN 78.11 79.03 79.07 76.79 95.59
ASR 9.83 3.41 7.16 11.08 2.86
FEATURE LOSS 1.00 1.68 1.06 1.02 0.81
Figure 5. Comparison between the proposed Renofeation approach
and baseline methods for clean-data performance (Left) and attack
success rate (Right).
3.4. Comparison with adversarial training
While we showed that our proposed Renofeation approach,
when compared to DELTA, achieves significant adversarial
robustness improvement with comparable clean-data per-
formance under our threat model, adversarial training can
also be considered as a defense under our threat model. As
a result, in this section, we compare our method with ad-
versarial training to further demonstrate the effectiveness
of our proposed method. To conduct adversarial training
in our considered threat model, we train DELTA with 2×
longer iterations and, for each iteration, we randomly sam-
ple a batch of benign examples or a batch of adversarial
examples crafted with three iterations of projected gradient
descent. As shown in Table 4, adversarial training indeed
achieves better robustness compared to the baselines but
worse compared to Renofeation.
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Table 4. Comparison between DELTA, DELTA with PGD-3 adver-
sarial training, and proposed Renofeation.
DOG BIRD ACTION INDOOR FLOWER
DELTA CLEAN 84.39 78.75 77.69 78.36 95.90ASR 95.65 58.83 93.51 79.71 43.65
DELTA ADV. TRAINED CLEAN 82.83 77.10 75.69 77.84 95.12ASR 85.86 16.77 85.19 61.84 23.85
RENOFEATION CLEAN 78.11 79.03 79.07 76.79 95.59ASR 9.83 3.41 7.16 11.08 2.86
4. Ablation study
4.1. Regularization for baselines
In Renofeation, we incorporate both dropout and SWA for
improving robustness. One might naturally wonder if these
two techniques are specific to Renofeation. In other words,
can baselines such as re-training and DELTA benefit from
these techniques? To answer this question, we conduct
an ablation study for re-training and DELTA approaches
in conjunction with these two regularization techniques.
For SWA, we use the same hyper-parameters as mentioned
earlier, i.e., 0.005 constant learning rate, 30,000 iterations,
and average every 500 iterations. As shown in Figure 6,
we find that dropout improves robustness for DELTA while
SWA minimally helps. For both techniques, DELTA is still
highly vulnerable to adversarial examples for datasets such
as Dog, Action, and Indoor. On the other hand, dropout
and SWA help clean-data performance for re-training, but
the resulting performance still cannot compete with DELTA
for most datasets except for Bird. Overall, the proposed
Renofeation achieves the best of both worlds.
4.2. Limited training data
Earlier in Section 3.2 we noted that feature distillation using
the target dataset is able to achieve competitive performance
compared to fine-tuning. Intuitively, if the amount of train-
ing data is large, feature distillation should be able recover
the knowledge encoded in the pre-trained weights. However,
in the transfer learning case, target datasets usually have
much less training data compared to large-scale datasets
such as ImageNet. In this section, we ablate the number of
training samples to understand how it affects the effective-
ness of Renofeation so as to further provide a guideline for
when to use it. Specifically, we consider cases where the
training data for each dataset is reduced to 33% and 66%.
For each class in the dataset, we randomly sub-sample 33%
and 66% of the training images. As a result, the overall
training dataset is still balanced across classes.
As shown in Table 5, Renofeation introduces a larger gap in
the clean-data performance compared to re-training while
having similar robustness when data becomes limited. On
the other hand, when comparing Renofeation to DELTA,
clean-data performance is comparable for most datasets
except Dog, which aligns with our previous observation.
Overall, we find Renofeation to be even more preferable
when there is limited training data since the gap between
Renofeation and re-training becomes larger.
Table 5. Ablating the number of training samples for each dataset
to 33% and 66% and compare the performances among methods.
DOG BIRD ACTION INDOOR FLOWER
33%
DELTA CLEAN 81.80 63.41 70.72 70.97 90.11ASR 95.77 74.12 93.94 85.38 46.60
RENOFEATION CLEAN 74.13 61.75 69.22 70.22 88.32ASR 10.88 5.56 9.40 15.73 4.94
RE-TRAIN CLEAN 44.98 26.10 24.51 37.54 62.73ASR 9.67 14.68 9.22 8.35 2.85
66%
DELTA CLEAN 83.58 73.04 75.52 75.30 94.23ASR 95.36 64.58 93.80 80.77 56.39
RENOFEATION CLEAN 77.25 74.46 76.09 74.48 93.56ASR 9.85 3.55 7.53 12.22 4.73
RE-TRAIN CLEAN 64.03 56.47 40.73 52.61 80.60ASR 7.72 10.79 5.86 7.23 3.23
4.3. Results on more networks
So far, we have conducted our experiments and analyses
based on ResNet-18. We are interested to see if Renofeation
is still more preferable compared to re-training and DELTA
for other networks. Specifically, we further consider deeper
networks, i.e., ResNet-50 and ResNet-101. Additionally,
due to recent interests in reducing the computational over-
head of ConvNets for deployment purpose (Wang et al.,
2020; Stamoulis et al., 2019; Sandler et al., 2018; Chin et al.,
2019; Wu et al., 2019), we also consider a compact network,
i.e., MobileNetV2 (Sandler et al., 2018). Due to computa-
tional considerations, for DELTA with other networks, we
inherit the learning rate, weight decay, and momentum from
ResNet-18 for each of the dataset.
As shown in Table 6, Renofeation achieves clean-data per-
formance comparable to that of DELTA and has robustness
similar to re-training across all ConvNets we have investi-
gated.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed Renofeation, a transfer learn-
ing method that is significantly more robust to adversarial
attacks based on the pre-trained model when compared to
state-of-the-art transfer learning based on fine-tuning. More-
over, under the considered threat model (adversary only
has information to the pre-trained model), Renofeation is
preferable to combining fine-tuning with adversarial training
using three steps of projected gradient descent. In contrast
to transfer learning methods based on fine-tuning, the key
ingredients of our approach are the randomly initialized
weights (as opposed to using pre-trained weights) and noisy
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Figure 6. Ablation study of the effect of dropout (DO) and SWA on (Left) clean-data performance and (Right) attack success rate for the
two baselines including DELTA and re-training.
Table 6. Comparing DELTA, Renofeation, and re-training for different ConvNets.
DOG BIRD ACTION INDOOR FLOWER AVERAGE
RESNET-18
DELTA CLEAN 84.39 78.75 77.69 78.36 95.90 -ASR 95.65 58.83 93.51 79.71 43.65 74.27
RENOFEATION CLEAN 78.11 79.03 79.07 76.79 95.59 -ASR 9.83 3.41 7.16 11.08 2.86 6.87
RE-TRAIN CLEAN 70.77 69.76 51.90 59.93 87.38 -ASR 5.99 6.14 5.82 6.73 3.00 5.54
RESNET-50
DELTA CLEAN 90.13 81.95 81.87 79.93 96.63 -ASR 94.69 32.29 91.94 84.69 24.84 65.69
RENOFEATION CLEAN 83.57 79.27 84.04 80.67 96.75 -ASR 5.08 3.96 3.33 7.12 2.39 4.38
RE-TRAIN CLEAN 72.55 70.47 53.53 59.11 85.93 -ASR 6.30 7.45 6.11 6.06 2.20 5.62
RESNET-101
DELTA CLEAN 91.92 82.07 82.61 80.00 96.37 -ASR 88.03 42.60 87.53 89.27 44.04 70.29
RENOFEATION CLEAN 83.88 80.98 84.67 80.97 96.33 -ASR 4.38 3.54 3.69 9.95 3.09 4.93
RE-TRAIN CLEAN 73.42 71.80 52.78 61.12 85.59 -ASR 6.64 7.21 6.64 5.13 2.00 5.52
MOBILENETV2
DELTA CLEAN 84.86 78.51 78.94 76.12 96.68 -ASR 82.89 40.30 57.00 52.45 21.08 50.75
RENOFEATION CLEAN 76.42 75.70 77.78 76.49 96.32 -ASR 11.62 6.79 5.92 7.12 2.84 6.86
RE-TRAIN CLEAN 67.95 69.50 52.86 61.49 88.73 -ASR 8.56 8.54 8.35 7.65 2.71 7.16
feature distillation. To achieve noisy feature distillation,
we incorporate two deep learning regularization techniques,
namely spatial-dropout and stochastic weight averaging. We
have conducted extensive experiments including a compre-
hensive ablation study to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed method compared to its competitors.
While the threat model under consideration is relatively
new (Rezaei & Liu, 2020), it is crucial to improve robustness
under this threat model due to the practical popularity of
fine-tuning. This work takes a first step towards improving
the robustness under this threat model and sheds light on
this topic for future study.
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